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NEGOTIATING GENDER AND (FREE AND
EQUAL) CITIZENSHIP: THE PLACE OF
ASSOCIATIONS
Linda C. McClain*
It is a great honor to be part of this symposium devoted to
considering the import of the work of John Rawls for law. I consider
myself a liberal feminist, and my understanding of liberalism owes
much to Rawls’s inspiring work. I am also honored to have been on a
panel on “Equal Citizenship: Gender” with Susan Moller Okin, from
whose pathbreaking work on justice, gender, and families I have
learned much.1 Her work was an important opening salvo in what
remains, as she puts it, an “unfinished debate” between Rawls and
feminists about justice and gender, and it prompted Rawls to make
more explicit both the place of families in a well-ordered society, as
well as the place of justice within families.2
One focus of my own participation in this debate is to work out a
liberal feminist account of the place of families in what I call a
formative project of fostering the capacities for democratic and
personal self-government.3 In a previous symposium in this series of
conferences on constitutional theory, The Constitution and the Good
Society, I addressed the question of the domain of sex equality,
arguing that sex equality is a component of civic virtue and a public
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. This Article grew out of my
presentation for the “Equal Citizenship: Gender” panel at the Conference on Rawls
and the Law, held at Fordham University School of Law, November 7-8, 2003. I
thank my co-panelists, Tracy Higgins, Susan Moller Okin, and Marion Smiley, as well
as conference participants, for helpful discussion of the issues raised in this Article.
Thanks also to Nora Demleitner, Jim Fleming, and Gila Stopler for valuable
comments. Thanks to my research assistant Tali Harel and to law librarian Cindie
Leigh for help with sources. A research grant from Hofstra University supported this
Article.
1. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989).
2. Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 1537 (2004). Rawls addresses Okin’s criticisms of his treatment of families in
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 162-68 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001), and in
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765 (1997)
[hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason]. Tragically, Professor Okin died just as I was
finishing this Article. Regrettably, this debate, to which she contributed so much, will
remain doubly unfinished. The insightful work she did during her life, however, will
continue to inform it.
3. I explain this approach in a book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity,
Equality, and Responsibility (under contract with Harvard University Press).
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value relevant to the regulation of families.4 In the present Article, I
will focus on the place of associations both within political liberalism
and in the feminist liberalism I espouse. I will use the term
“associations” to refer to institutions of civil society other than
families: religious institutions, cultural institutions, and the array of
voluntary nongovernmental organizations that are found in society.
Just as feminists question whether Rawls’s A Theory of Justice
adequately attended to justice within families, thus missing the
problem of sex inequality, so they also worry that his treatment of
associations and, in particular, religious and cultural institutions, in
Political Liberalism may hinder women’s equal citizenship. Here, too,
Okin’s critique of Rawls’s political liberalism is instructive.5
This Article begins by recapitulating how Rawls presents the place
of associations. I focus on his view that associations underwrite a
stable political order and foster the basic good of self-respect, even as
the principles of justice shape the domain of associational life.
Political liberalism distinguishes between the domain of the political
and the domain of civil society, yet it posits a relationship of mutual
support, or of reciprocally constituting domains. What implications
does this distinction, as well as this relationship of support, have for
the issue of gender and free and equal citizenship? Does Rawls’s
attention to this issue offer a satisfactory response to feminist
concerns? In taking up criticisms of Rawls’s response by Okin, as well
as by liberal feminist Martha Nussbaum,6 I offer a reading of Rawls
that is more optimistic as to grounding support for the freedom and
equality of women within political liberalism and to drawing on
political liberalism in a liberal feminist account of the place of
associations.
The second aim of this Article is to bring these liberal, and liberal
feminist, ideas about associations into dialogue with a body of
significant, recent feminist work on the relationship between cultural
and religious traditions and associations and women’s freedom and
equality. Some of this work directly responds to Okin’s provocative
essay, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?,7 which argued that liberal
theorists attracted to group rights for religious and cultural minorities
within liberal societies seemed to overlook the tension between
affirming such rights and feminism’s goals of ending the subordination
and unequal status of women. Other work emerges out of the study
of efforts by groups of women around the world to challenge
4. See Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society:
Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1617 (2001).
5. See Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 Ethics 23
(1994).
6. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The
Capabilities Approach 270-83 (2000) (discussing Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2).
7. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 9 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
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dominant interpretations of religion and culture with alternative
interpretations that better support women’s freedom and equality.
This feminist work contends not only that Okin, but also many
other liberals, liberal feminists, and human rights advocates, too
starkly frame the choice for women as rights or religion, or rights
versus culture and community.8 This places equal citizenship and
associational membership at odds. Instead, these feminists counter
with a model that would insist on rights and religion and culture,
reconciling women’s demands for equality and liberty with their
demands for meaningful self-government within religious and cultural
associations.
Such a model raises difficult questions about
governmental regulation of associations and about how a society best
addresses the tension between associational self-government and the
personal self-government of individuals within associations.9 In this
Article, I identify a dialogue between this feminist approach and a
liberal feminism informed by political liberalism as a fruitful next step
in considering the place of associations in fostering free and equal
citizenship and addressing these important questions about their
proper regulation.
I. THE PLACE OF FAMILIES AND ASSOCIATIONS IN POLITICAL
LIBERALISM
A. Growing Up Under Just Social and Political Institutions
Rawls’s political liberalism posits that if we as members of society
“grow up under a framework of reasonable and just political and
social institutions, we shall affirm those institutions when we in our
turn come of age, and they will endure over time.”10 He refers to this
as a process of “moral learning,” whereby “citizens develop a sense of
justice as they grow up and take part in their just social world.”11 This
process of moral learning helps to ensure what he calls “[s]tability for
the right reasons”—that is, stability is not merely a modus vivendi,
but, over time, “citizens acquire a sense of justice that inclines them
not only to accept but to act upon the principles of justice.”12 It was
precisely Rawls’s reliance upon the role of civil society in the process
8. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 Yale L.J. 1399 (2003); Gila
Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community,
and Women’s Equality (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also
discussion infra Part II.
9. Nussbaum, for example, who identifies her approach as both universalist and a
form of political liberalism, would address this tension by making the promotion of
human capabilities a compelling state interest and evaluating families and associations
based on how well they do in developing the human capabilities of their members. See
Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 275-76.
10. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 7 (1999).
11. Id. at 44.
12. Id. at 45.
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of moral learning that led my co-panelist Susan Moller Okin to ask
how one vital component of civil society—the family—could serve as
a school for citizenship if principles of justice had no place within it
and if its actual practices were unjust.13
One much-discussed feature of Rawls’s political liberalism is his
premise that it is possible to have a stable political order that rests
upon a shared political conception of justice, rather than on a shared,
or unitary, comprehensive doctrine, such as a shared religion. Rawls
argued that, given the “fact of reasonable pluralism, constitutional
democracy must have political and social institutions that effectively
lead its citizens to acquire the appropriate sense of justice as they
grow up and take part in society.”14 Political liberalism maintains that
a reasonable political conception of justice can be supported by an
“overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”15 As
Rawls envisions this supporting role played by comprehensive
doctrines, many of which arise out of associations:
Comprehensive doctrines of all kinds—religious, philosophical, and
moral—belong to what we may call the “background culture” of
civil society. This is the culture of the social, not of the political. It
is the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and
universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and teams, to
mention a few. In a democratic society there is a tradition of
democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and
intelligible to the educated common sense of citizens generally.
Society’s main institutions, and their accepted form of
interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and
principles.16

Thus, the “background culture” of civil society undergirds a shared
political conception of justice. Moreover, it facilitates persons
developing into free and equal citizens. In Political Liberalism, Rawls
posits that the “background institutions of civil society” provide
persons with “those basic freedoms and opportunities . . . that enable
us to become free and equal citizens in the first place.”17 He speaks of
the “prior and fundamental role” of society’s basic institutions “in
establishing a social world within which alone we can develop with
care, nurture, and education, and no little good fortune, into free and
equal citizens.”18
Whether or not Rawls’s vision of a “freestanding political
conception”19 of justice, supported by and yet separate and apart from

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Okin, supra note 1.
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 10, at 15.
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 44 (1996).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id. at xlvii.
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comprehensive doctrines, offers a realistic model has been a subject of
considerable discussion. Even many liberals reject the quest for a
“political” liberalism—that is, one that maintains that it is possible to
have a stable political order without a shared vision of the good. That
is not a debate I wish to take up or add to here. Instead, my focus is
on the tensions inherent in the idea of the “background” role that civil
society plays in supporting the political order and fostering free and
equal citizenship.
On the one hand, Rawls does not insist upon “congruence” between
the values and virtues of the political order and those of civil society.
Indeed, he observes that they are not identical and envisions a
“division of labor” among the political and other domains so that each
has a conception of justice and set of principles and values appropriate
to it.20 On the other hand, political liberalism also posits some
continuity—or congruence—between the realm of civil society and
the political realm, which allows the former to be a “fund of implicitly
shared ideas and principles”21 that make political stability possible.
Thus, Rawls writes: “[A] freestanding political conception [of justice]
does not . . . say that political values are separate from, or
discontinuous with, other values.”22 Rather, political liberalism aims
to specify the “political domain and its conception of justice in such a
way” that overlapping consensus is possible, and “citizens
themselves . . . view the political conception as derived from, or
congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values.”23 In
other words, there is a “liberal expectancy” of some congruence.24
Thus, there may be some affinity between Rawls’s idea of the place of
associations in underwriting constitutional democracy and the claims
of proponents of civil society that the institutions of civil society are
“seedbeds of civic virtue.”25
Political liberalism can harbor such a “liberal expectancy” precisely
because it does not leave the shape of civil society entirely to chance.
Rather, political liberalism requires that a political conception of
justice should shape the “social world,” or just social world, including
the “background culture” of civil society, so that it will foster free and
equal citizenship and support for a political conception of justice.
Thus, Rawls urges readers of Political Liberalism to think of the
principles of justice as “designed to form the social world in which our
20. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 789-90.
21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 14.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
24. On “congruence” and the idea that Rawls’s work has this “liberal
expectancy,” see the helpful discussion in Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and
Morals 50-58 (1998).
25. For discussion, see McClain, supra note 4; Linda C. McClain & James E.
Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 301, 303
& passim (2000).
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character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our
comprehensive views and their conceptions of the good, are first
acquired, and in which our moral powers must be realized, if they are
to be realized at all.”26
In a sense, the political domain and the domain of the social world
are mutually constituting, but the principles of justice, at the outset,
place constraints on the form the social world may assume. Again,
there is a tension between affirming separate domains and insisting
upon political liberalism’s need to shape the associational domain.
Thus, on the one hand, Rawls argues that associations, such as
churches and universities, require principles “plainly more suitable”
for their own shared aims and purposes than the principles of justice.
However, he states: “[B]ecause churches and universities are
associations within the basic structure, they must adjust to the
requirements that this structure imposes in order to establish
background justice.”27 For example, these associations “may be
restricted . . . by what is necessary to maintain the basic equal liberties
(including liberty of conscience) and fair equality of opportunity.”28
As Rawls elaborates in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited:
A domain so-called, or a sphere of life, is not, then, something
already given apart from political conceptions of justice. A domain
is not a kind of space, or place, but rather is simply the result, or
upshot, of how the principles of political justice are applied, directly
to the basic structure and indirectly to the associations within it.29

Rawls’s clarification, in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited and in
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, about the place of justice in
families and associations arose in response to feminist critique of his
apparent inattention to this question. Rawls offers the example of
how principles of justice should shape one basic social institution, the
family, but also suggests that a similar analysis would apply to
associations and other parts of the “nonpolitical domain” included in
the basic structure. His response, however, leaves at least some
sympathetic feminist critics, such as Okin and Nussbaum, dissatisfied.
Nussbaum, for example, contends that “Rawls’s approach seems to
me to stop somewhat short of what justice requires.”30 What are the
reasons for this dissatisfaction? Is it justified? I share some of their
concerns, but my own reading is more sanguine than theirs in that the
remarks Rawls offers may support a robust embrace of the freedom
26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 41. Thus, the “just background
of that social world is given by the content of the political conception so that by public
reason all citizens can understand its role and share its political values in the same
way.” Id. at 43.
27. Id. at 261.
28. Id.
29. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 791.
30. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 274.
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and equality of women. The debate between Rawls and feminists
must, regrettably, remain (as Okin puts it) “unfinished.” But I take a
more optimistic view of the direction in which the debate between
Rawlsian liberals and feminists might travel.
Rawls writes in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited that it is a
“misconception” to think that the principles of justice “do not apply to
the family and hence those principles do not secure equal justice for
women and their children.”31 He identifies as one possible source of
this misconception the ideal that “[t]he principles of political justice
are to apply directly to [the basic structure of society], but are not to
apply directly to the internal life of the many associations within it, the
family among them.”32 But this question of how the principles of
justice apply to society’s main institutions is “not peculiar” to families,
Rawls observes, but “arises in regard to all associations, whether they
be churches or universities, professional or scientific associations,
business firms or labor unions.”33 For example, he asserts that it is
“[not] desirable, or consistent with liberty of conscience or freedom of
association” that the principles of political justice would apply to the
internal life of churches, just as he assumes that “[w]e wouldn’t want
political principles of justice—including principles of distributive
justice—to apply directly to the internal life of the family.”34
Political liberalism does not insist upon complete congruence
between principles of political justice and the “internal life” of
associations. At the same time, the principles of justice “protect the
rights and liberties” of persons even when they are members of
associations, and thus place certain constraints on associational selfgovernment. Thus, as applied to the family, “political principles do
not apply directly to its internal life, but they do impose essential
constraints on the family as an institution and so guarantee the basic
rights and liberties, and the freedom and opportunities, of all its
members.”35 Rawls’s justification for this distinction rests on political
liberalism’s commitment to toleration of reasonable comprehensive
views and for persons’ freedom to exercise personal self-government.
In her contribution to this symposium, Okin contends that this
answer about the place of justice within the family and its distinction
between the direct and indirect application of the principles of justice
is unsatisfying to feminists such as herself, to whom it is not at all
evident that we would not want families to be regulated internally by
principles of distributive justice.36 As her other work indicates, Okin
would similarly ask the question “Why not?,” with respect to religious
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 788.
Id.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 789.
Okin, supra note 2, at 1550-51.
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and cultural associations.37 She suggests that Rawls’s characterization
of “all the main historical religions” (with the exception of certain
kinds of fundamentalism) as “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” is
quite problematic in view of the sexism that is “rife” in the basic texts
of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.38 She also contends that political
liberalism’s commitment to toleration leads it to tolerate forms of
discrimination against women that would not be tolerated if they were
based on race or ethnicity.39
Are Okin’s concerns warranted? I agree with her that there is need
for further feminist engagement with political liberalism on such
issues as the reach of the principles of justice into social institutions.
Feminist criticism, like that of Okin’s, about justice, gender, and the
family has helped to clarify important points about the place of
families. Less adequately addressed in feminist criticism are the
implications of Rawls’s discussion in The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited for feminist reflection on the place of associations. What
potential does political liberalism harbor for an account of
associations that attends to the ways not only in which they may help
but also hinder persons negotiating gender and citizenship?
First, it is striking that in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
Rawls refers to a “gender system” and observes that “surely that
system is subject to critique by the principles of justice.”40 A basic aim
of political liberalism is to derive political principles of justice that
specify a “single social system,” the “basic structure” of society; “[i]ts
basic principles of political justice specify all its main parts and its
basic rights reach throughout.”41 Feminist criticism of A Theory of
Justice, it is fair to say, helped Rawls to focus on the problem of sex
inequality and how certain assumptions about justice within that
single social system, or the basic structure, were unwarranted. Thus,
Rawls recognizes that “gender-structured institutions” may require
reform. He writes:
The crucial question may be what precisely is covered by genderstructured institutions. How are their lines drawn? If we say the
gender system includes whatever social arrangements adversely
affect the equal basic liberties and opportunities of women, as well
as those of their children as future citizens, then surely that system is
subject to critique by the principles of justice. The question then
becomes whether the fulfillment of these principles suffices to
remedy the gender system’s faults. The remedy depends in part on

37. Id.; see also Okin, supra note 5.
38. Okin, supra note 2, at 1555-56 (citing Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note
15, at 170).
39. Id. at 1557.
40. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 793.
41. Id. at 791.
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social theory and human psychology, and much else. It cannot be
settled by a conception of justice alone.42

Rawls describes the family as “a crucial case for seeing whether the
single system—the basic structure—affords equal justice to both men
and women.”43 Moreover, he specifies some remedies, permissible
within political liberalism, to address injustice within families related
to the gendered division of labor.44 As Okin points out, these
remedies affirm some of the suggestions his feminist critics have
proposed as to how to make families more just social institutions.45
Might further reflection have led Rawls to focus upon whether
associations foster the “gender system” in ways that warrant remedy?
What might Rawls have delineated as permissible remedies for
injustices linked to the “gender system” in other associations, such as
religious and cultural institutions, that exist within the single social
system? In responding to Okin, Rawls refers to Mill’s recognition that
the family of his day was “a school for male despotism: it inculcated
habits of thought and ways of feeling and conduct incompatible with
democracy.”46 Rawls goes on to observe: “If so, the principles of
justice enjoining a reasonable constitutional democratic society can
plainly be invoked to reform the family.”47 Because Okin squarely
raised her criticism about injustice within families in terms of the
impact of such injustice on a crucial assumption within Rawls’s
theory—that families will be sites of moral learning that will undergird
the political order—Rawls could clearly see that this problem required
a remedy. In addition to unfairness to women, these injustices also
“tend to undermine children’s capacity to acquire the political virtues
required of future citizens in a viable democratic society.”48 Had
Rawls reflected further upon the matter, might he have made a
parallel move to recognize that certain cultural and religious
associations—rather
than
being
examples
of
reasonable
comprehensive doctrines—may teach and perpetuate messages of
gender hierarchy and male authority at odds with fostering the
capacities for personal and democratic self-government? And if this
would serve to perpetuate an unjust “gender system,” what sort of
remedies might a Rawlsian liberalism support?
These tantalizing questions must remain unanswered, at least with
respect to Rawls’s own work. I believe, however, that it is possible to
draw support from Rawls’s idea of a “gender system” in need of
remedy in order to develop an account of how associations fit into
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 793.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 792-93.
Okin, supra note 2, at 1565.
Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 790.
Id. at 790-91.
Id. at 790.
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“the basic structure” that “affords equal justice to both men and
women.” For example, the idea of a “gender system” might be
extended to focus on how cultural, religious, and legal enforcement of
a norm of heterosexuality limits women’s and men’s freedom and
equality. If so, then a proper ordering of political values might well
condemn such measures as the Defense of Marriage Act and the more
recently proposed “federal marriage amendment.”49
Similarly,
feminist scholars might fruitfully consider how a proper ordering of
political values brings into focus the intertwining of the “gender
system” with ethnic, racial, and economic systems as well (i.e., other
divisions of labor within society reflecting historical injustice, and also
adversely affecting equal basic liberties and opportunities).
Second, the helpful method Rawls suggests in The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited is reflection on how the “ordering of political
values” should apply to institutions within the basic structure. Thus,
he indicates in his discussion of the family as “part of the basic
structure” that among these values are “the freedom and equality of
women, the equality of children as future citizens, the freedom of
religion, and finally, the value of the family in securing the orderly
production and reproduction of society and of its culture from one
generation to the next.”50 Rawls then states: “These values provide
public reasons for all citizens.”51 I find this statement to be critically
important because it grounds “the freedom and equality of women” as
a part of public reason, not merely part of one of many contested
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. As I have written elsewhere,
feminists working within a political liberal framework may usefully
employ this commitment to women’s freedom and equality to explain
why governmental measures to foster such freedom and equality are
justifiable and consistent with toleration.52 As Okin points out, there
is also enormous potential in Rawls’s statement in the introduction to
Political Liberalism that “[t]he same equality of the Declaration of
Independence which Lincoln invoked to condemn slavery can be
invoked to condemn the inequality and oppression of women.”53
49. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)). The proposed federal marriage amendment,
known as the “marriage bill,” introduced by Representative Marilyn Musgrave, reads:
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor any state or federal law,
shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.” H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); see
also S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003).
50. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 793.
51. Id. at 793-94 (emphasis added).
52. See Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion
of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L.J.
21 (1998).
53. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at xxxi. For discussion, see Okin,
supra note 2, at 1565.
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These two statements about women’s freedom and equality,
together with Rawls’s recognition that the “gender system” may be
subject to critique by the principles of justice, securely ground the
place of sex equality within a political conception of a well-ordered
society. To be sure, the questions surrounding the place of women
and men in society—particularly as they relate to proper gender roles
and identities in the domains of sexuality, family, marriage, and
work—continue to be matters as to which there is considerable
disagreement. In our constitutional order, however, at least since the
doctrinal shifts in equal protection law commencing in the 1970s, the
requirements of equal citizenship bar state support of the sort of
gender hierarchy of male authority/female deference within families
and other spheres of civil society that made up the system.54 Similarly,
civil rights laws of the 1960s put limits on both public and private
forms of discrimination that were part of this “gender system.”
If the political conception of the place of gender in the social system
has changed from hierarchy to equality, so that—as I have argued
elsewhere55—sex equality is a political value as well as a constitutional
norm, what implications does this have for notions of proper gender
ordering in the “social world”? What implications does this have for
what sort of freedom of association is compatible with this political
value, or how to order this political value and other important
political values?
How political liberalism might answer these questions seems to turn
on three distinctions. The first, already discussed, is its insistence that
54. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that a statute that
granted a husband, as “head and master” of property he jointly owned with his wife
the sole right to dispose of the property without his wife’s consent violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(holding that a statutory scheme providing that husbands, but not wives, may be
required to pay alimony upon divorce violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause because a gender-neutral classification would serve as well as a
gender classification (which carried the baggage of gender-role stereotypes) to carry
out the state’s compensatory and ameliorative purposes); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977) (holding that a sex-based distinction between widows and widowers,
in which Social Security Act survivors’ benefits were payable to a female wage
earner’s widower only if he was receiving at least half of his support from her, while
they were payable to a male wage earner’s widow regardless of dependency, violated
due process and equal protection); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (holding that
a statute—under which girls attained majority, and ceased receiving child support,
when they became eighteen, but boys did not until they became twenty-one—could
not survive an equal protection attack); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(holding that statutes presuming, solely for administrative convenience, that spouses
of male members of the military are dependents for the purpose of obtaining certain
benefits, but that spouses of female members are not, unless they are dependent for
over one-half of their support, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that statutes providing that, between
persons equally qualified to administer estates, males must be preferred to females
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
55. McClain, supra note 4.
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the principles of justice apply directly to the basic structure, by
constraining associations from violating citizens’ basic rights and
liberties and freedom of opportunities, but do not directly apply to the
“internal life” of associations. The second is the distinction between
“reasonable pluralism” and pluralism as such (and “reasonable” and
“unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines). The third is the distinction
between government’s authority to eliminate and remedy involuntary,
as distinguished from voluntary, gendered divisions of labor. Okin
and our co-panelist Tracy Higgins, for example, find Rawls’s use and
application of all of these distinctions troubling, for they conclude that
they allow religiously grounded forms of sex inequality.56
A full discussion of these distinctions, and, particularly, how Rawls
distinguishes “reasonable” and “unreasonable” comprehensive
doctrines, is beyond the scope of this Article. The crucial issue at
hand is feminist fear that political liberalism’s toleration of
“reasonable” comprehensive views will extend too far and include
religious and cultural traditions that justify sex inequality and, because
of gender role conceptions, limit persons’ development of their
capacities for personal and democratic self-government.
In light of political liberalism’s embrace of “the freedom and
equality of women” as a political value, may a comprehensive doctrine
that denies such freedom and equality be “reasonable,” or must it be
deemed “unreasonable”? Political Liberalism rules out of bounds “a
conception of the good requiring the repression or degradation of
certain persons on, say, racial, or ethnic, or perfectionist grounds, for
example, slavery in ancient Athens, or in the antebellum south.”57
Okin points out this passage and asks why political liberalism would
not similarly condemn doctrines requiring the repression or
degradation of persons on the grounds of sex.58
This is an important question, and I believe that the answer is that
political liberalism would condemn such doctrines. First, given that
political liberalism recognizes the freedom and equality of women as a
political value, surely these doctrines would and should be considered
unreasonable. Second, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls himself
indicates that the idea of basic human rights places limits on a
religion’s ability to “claim as a justification for its subjection of women
that it is necessary for its survival.”59 Rawls draws on analogies to the
argument that “a religion cannot claim as a justification that its
intolerance of other religions is necessary for it to maintain itself.”60
In both cases, “[b]asic human rights are involved, and these belong to
56. Okin, supra note 2, at 1552-62; Tracy Higgins, Why Feminists Can’t (or
Shouldn’t) Be Liberals, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1629 (2004).
57. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 196.
58. Okin, supra note 2, at 1557.
59. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 10, at 111.
60. Id.
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the common institutions and practices of all liberal and decent
societies.”61 From this argument, I infer that even though political
liberalism recognizes that associations may have principles of justice
distinct from the political conception of justice, the political
conception may not tolerate certain views of justice generated or
sustained by associations.
What is the scope of the idea of the “subjection of women”? Would
forms of gender socialization raise concerns similar to those raised by
repression or degradation? What if, as some scholars contend, the
practical effect of education in Christian fundamentalist and Catholic
schools is to teach female students that “they are by virtue of their
gender, inferior human beings”?62 One study concludes:
Fundamentalist schools deliberately and systematically inculcate in
their students the belief that females are inferior to males, that a
woman’s only purpose in life is to serve a husband and raise
children, and that only men should pursue careers outside the home,
become active in public affairs and leaders of their community, or
even to assert opinions about matters beyond home life. To think
otherwise is sinful: “sexual equality denies God’s word.”63

If this research is credible, and such education takes a toll on young
women’s capacities, can these religious traditions be “reasonable”
ones?
Political liberalism’s concern for children’s developing the capacity
to be fully cooperating members of society would surely lead to some
constraints on associations’ perpetuating these sorts of messages,
whether this took the form of educational campaigns by government
to promote sex equality or curriculum requirements to do so. Surely,
political liberalism could not endorse government’s financially
supporting such messages, for example, through a voucher program.
For instance, Gila Stopler argues that, just as states may require that a
religious educational institution’s participation in a voucher program
is contingent upon its not teaching messages of hatred based on, for
example, race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion, states should also
include sex in this list.64 Indeed, she proposes that given the harmful
impact of certain forms of religious socialization upon girls’ capacity
for citizenship, schools receiving vouchers should be required to
include education for equality between the sexes. In other writing, I
support this sort of education as a component of public schools’
mission. It seems credible to extend this requirement once private

61. Id.
62. Stopler, supra note 8, at 63.
63. Id. (quoting James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights 39
(1998)).
64. Id. at 67.

MCCLAINBP

1582

4/18/2004 2:01 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

schools take on public funding and, thus, arguably, advance public
purposes.65
A tougher case is posed by religious doctrines that affirm a basic
equality of women and men before God, but interpret this equality to
encompass complementary, and different, natures and capacities of
women and men that warrant different social roles and levels of
authority.66 Are these “reasonable” or “unreasonable”? In Part II, I
suggest that one useful way to explore these questions about the place
of women’s freedom and equality in “reasonable” comprehensive
doctrines is through looking at the efforts of feminists working within
particular cultural and religious traditions to challenge understandings
of those doctrines that hinder, rather than foster, women’s freedom
and equality.
Issues of gender complementarity also implicate Rawls’s distinction
between the place for voluntary and involuntary gendered divisions of
labor within the family as well as, I infer, associations. What is a
“voluntary” gendered division of labor? What distinguishes it from an
“involuntary” one? There may be more room for feminists to work
with this distinction than Okin allows. Rawls argues that political
liberalism can seek to reduce the involuntary gendered division of
labor within the basic structure to zero, but that it “may have to allow
for some traditional gendered division of labor within families—
assume, say, that this division is based on religion—provided it is fully
voluntary and does not result from or lead to injustice.”67 For
example, he writes: “If the gendered division of labor in the family is
indeed fully voluntary, then there is reason to think that the single
system realizes fair equality of opportunity for both genders.”68
Rawls’s example of a “voluntary” division of labor as one “based on
religion” comes with two important qualifications. First, Rawls’s
definition of “voluntary” is more demanding than a simple affirmation
of one’s religion. Rather, in a footnote, he explains that the decision
must be voluntary in the sense of being “reasonable”—that is, “doing
the rational thing when all the surrounding conditions are also fair,”
65. McClain, supra note 4, at 1653-64. On the idea of harnessing religious
educational institutions to advance public purposes by government’s attaching certain
anti-discrimination requirements to the receipt of public funds, see Stephen Macedo,
The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social Capital and Substantive
Morality, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1573 (2001).
66. See Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts:
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76
S. Cal. L. Rev. 189 (2002). As Blenkhorn writes, “most Muslims believe that women
and men are spiritually equal before God, but that women are socially inferior to men
due to distinct, asymmetrical domestic duties.” Id. at 194. Arguments about gender
complementarity within various denominations of Christianity draw on biblical verses
about the husband’s being the “head” of the household and the wife’s owing
obedience.
67. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 792.
68. Id.
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or in the case of religious conviction, “affirming one’s religion is
voluntary when all of the surrounding conditions are reasonable, or
fair.”69 Although Rawls does not pursue it in the text, this indication
that the “subjective conditions of voluntariness”70 must be present
gives, in my view, considerable room to argue about how the gender
system that shapes the surrounding conditions calls into question
assumptions about “voluntariness.” For example, if socialization of
girls and women into a particular religion’s teachings has the effect of
impairing their capacity for exercising personal self-government, or
what some scholars call “autonomy competency,” then this would
appear to call into question whether a gendered division of labor is
voluntary.71 By analogy, feminists have done helpful work on the
constraints on women’s “choice” in the context of their respective
investments in work and family.72 This work illuminates how unjust
social conditions that are not supportive of the important task (and
political value) of reproduction and social reproduction make it more
rational for women to opt out of paid employment.73
A second qualification Rawls offers is that the gendered division of
labor does not “lead to injustice.”74 This qualification offers room for
challenges to unjust results. A more systemic argument is also
available. In Political Liberalism, Rawls explains that the “role of the
institutions that belong to the basic structure is to secure just
background conditions against which the actions of individuals and
associations take place.”75 However, “[u]nless this structure is
appropriately regulated and adjusted, an initially just social process
will eventually cease to be just, however free and fair particular
transactions may look when viewed by themselves.”76 Addressing this
tendency requires “special institutions to preserve background

69. Id. at 792 n.68.
70. Id.
71. Stopler, supra note 8, at 57 (drawing on the idea of “autonomy competency”
in Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (1989)).
72. Joan Williams, Unbending Gender (2000).
73. To take one recent example involving the gendered division of labor within
the family, a recent New York Times Magazine had a cover story entitled Q: Why
Don’t More Women Get to the Top? A: They Choose Not To. The premise of the
story was that highly educated women were part of a new revolution of “opting out”
of careers because they put more value on staying home to raise their children. But at
least some of the women profiled seemed to make choices that were less than “fully
voluntary” in the sense that Rawls uses the term. For example, two women who were
mothers tried unsuccessfully within their places of employment to negotiate a work
schedule that would have allowed them to combine mothering responsibilities and
their job. Their proposals were ignored or met with indifference; only then, with
some considerable regret, did they leave their jobs. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out
Revolution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
74. Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 792.
75. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 266.
76. Id.
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justice.”77 This diagnosis of a tendency toward injustice shifts a focus
from voluntary and involuntary to a more systemic need for
regulation. Although Rawls does not develop such an argument in
the context of the “single social system’s” tendency toward an unjust
“gender system,” liberal feminists certainly could pursue this line of
argument and explore what sorts of special institutions might be
appropriate and how they might shape the basic structure within
which associational life occurs.
B. The Place of Associations in Fostering Self-Respect of Persons and
Peoples
The place of associations in a political liberal order is not confined
to their role in undergirding a political consensus and fostering
members’ capacities for democratic self-government. Rawls also
speaks of the place of associations and associative ties in helping
members of society to realize the important good (in Rawls’s
terminology, the “primary good”) of self-respect.78 This function of
associations appears to relate particularly to aiding persons’
development of their capacity to form, act on, and revise a conception
of a good life. As Rawls wrote in A Theory of Justice:
It normally suffices [to provide a basis of self-respect] that for each
person there is some association (one or more) to which he belongs
and within which the activities that are rational for him are publicly
affirmed by others. In this way we acquire a sense that what we do
in everyday life is worthwhile. Moreover, associative ties strengthen
the second aspect of self-esteem, since they tend to reduce the
likelihood of failure and to provide support against the sense of selfdoubt when mishaps occur. To be sure, men [sic] have varying
capacities and abilities, and what seems interesting and challenging
to some will not seem so to others. Yet in a well-ordered society
anyway, there are a variety of communities and associations, and the
members of each have their own ideals appropriately matched to
their aspirations and talents. . . . What counts is that the internal life
of these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants of
those belonging to them, and provides a secure basis for the sense of
worth of their members.79

Under what conditions will associational life foster self-respect?
Just as political liberalism views the political domain and the
“background culture” of civil society as mutually supporting each
other, so, too, the principles of justice specify that persons should be
accorded the “social bases of self-respect,” such as “the equal basic
rights and liberties, the fair value of the political liberties and fair

77. Id. at 267.
78. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 67, at 386-88 (rev. ed. 1999).
79. Id. at 387-88.
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equality of opportunity.”80 In other words, the political conception of
justice shapes the domain of the “background culture” of civil society
by ensuring that persons within civil society have these social bases of
self-respect. As noted above, in explaining the idea of distinct
domains, Rawls stresses that “[t]he principles defining the equal basic
liberties and opportunities of citizens always hold in and through all
so-called domains.”81 With respect to feminist concern about injustice
within families, Rawls responds: “The equal rights of women and the
basic rights of their children as future citizens are inalienable and
protect them wherever they are. Gender distinctions limiting those
rights and liberties are excluded.”82 Rawls intends this qualification to
apply to associations as well.
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls applies the idea of self-respect to
peoples. Here, too, he indicates the interplay between the political
domain and the “background culture” of civil society in fostering selfrespect. He argues that the self-respect of “liberal peoples” “rests on
the freedom and integrity of their citizens and the justice and decency
of their domestic political and social institutions,” as well as on “the
achievements of their public and civic culture”—all things “rooted in
their civic society.”83 Indeed, one argument Rawls offers against
imposing sanctions on “decent nonliberal peoples” is that it will
“wound” their self-respect.84 He contends that it is “surely . . . a good
for individuals and associations to be attached to their particular
culture and to take part in its common public and civic life,” for “in
this way political society is expressed and fulfilled.”85 Thus, he argues
for “due respect” by liberal peoples of decent nonliberal peoples, and
contends that a decent nonliberal society that receives this respect
“may be more likely, over time, to recognize the advantages of liberal
institutions and take steps toward becoming more liberal on its
own.”86
But what makes a society a “decent” nonliberal one? Rawls defines
“decent nonliberal peoples” in a way that insists that all members
have human rights, including the right to life, to liberty, to property,
and to formal equality “as expressed by the rules of natural justice.”87
As I discuss in the next section, Rawls gives particular attention to the
requirements that the basic human rights of women not be violated
and that women are represented in the political process.
It bears mentioning two different, but related, lines of possible

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 15, at 82 (citation omitted).
Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 791 (citation omitted).
Id.
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 10, at 47-48.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 65.
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feminist criticism of political liberalism’s link between participation in
associational life and the good of self-respect. First, feminists might
argue that this account ignores the fact that associations that do not
affirm and foster the freedom and equality of women may hinder,
rather than facilitate, women’s acquiring the good of self-respect.
Second, feminists might contend that Rawls’s account does not seem
to recognize the role of associations in affording a space in which
persons might find the self-respect denied them in other associations
or in society’s basic institutions. Further, such associations might
facilitate the articulation of dissenting views about what justice
requires and lead to social and, ultimately, legal and political change.
My view is that political liberalism attempts to address the first
problem through the idea that the principles of justice shape—and put
constraints upon—the nonpolitical domain, or the “background
culture of civil society” in a way that seeks to facilitate persons
acquiring self-respect. As to the second line of feminist criticism,
political liberalism recognizes, even if it does not elaborate upon, this
important transformative and political aspect of associational life, that
is, of the “background culture of civil society.”88 As I have explained
elsewhere, my own liberal feminist view of the place of associations
recognizes that “civil society contributes to liberal democracy by
affording oppositional space to ‘enclaves of protected discourse and
action,’ which allow social actors to seek to correct the injustices of an
ongoing democracy by bringing about social change.”89 As the next
part explains, this change may pertain to the norms and practices of
associations, as well as to laws and the polity.
II. RIGHTS VERSUS OR RIGHTS WITHIN RELIGION AND CULTURE?:
FEMINISTS DEBATE THE PLACE OF ASSOCIATIONS
Feminist debates in recent years over a perceived tension between
protection of associational life and securing women’s freedom and
equality arise in many contexts. For example, in her book, The Claims
of Culture, Seyla Benhabib identifies several examples, in the United
States and in other countries, of potential conflict between “claims to
cultural difference and universalist human-rights norms”:
the
assertion (in the United States) by cultural or ethnic minorities of
cultural defenses to criminal charges; the dilemma of reconciling (e.g.,
in India) generally applicable laws affording women certain rights and
protections with personal and family laws, based on religion, that
perpetuate gender hierarchy; and efforts by governments (e.g., in
France) to restrict the wearing of religious dress in public institutions
88. See Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 2, at 774-75 & nn.28 & 30.
89. McClain & Fleming, supra note 25, at 321-22 (using the phrase “enclaves of
protected discourse and action” found in Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting
Power: The Polity, in Democracy and Difference 58 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)).
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to promote civil solidarity and governmental neutrality toward
religion.90 An increasingly visible example is women living under
Muslim laws seeking to interpret—as well as transform—such laws in
ways supportive of their greater freedom and equality.91 Benhabib
posits that so many of the dilemmas regarding the limits of
multiculturalism implicate the “status of women in distinct cultural
communities” in part because “women and their bodies are the
symbolic-cultural site upon which human societies inscript their moral
order.”92
In Part I, I argued that participation in associations may foster
persons’ developing into free and equal citizens, with the capacity for
personal and democratic self-government, but that the claims of
associational life may also hinder such self-government. In recent
years, this tension has seemed especially acute when constraints on
women’s citizenship appear to find justification in religious and
cultural traditions. And notwithstanding the portrait of associations
as generating civic virtues, sometimes the values inculcated in
associations may be in conflict with democratic values. This raises the
question about the extent to which the values and virtues of
associations warrant toleration, in our constitutional order, even if
they conflict with democratic values and virtues.
As Benhabib observes, Okin’s “opening salvo” in the debate over
multiculturalism and women’s rights, Is Multiculturalism Bad for
Women?, “raised hackles” (even among feminists) in part for its
provocative way of putting the question.93 Just as Okin worries that
political liberalism’s toleration of “reasonable comprehensive
doctrines” allows for religious and cultural practices that discriminate
against women, her essay contends that a liberal impulse to extend
“group rights” to religious and cultural minorities may also lead to
tolerating religiously and culturally sanctioned forms of sex
inequality.94 She addresses liberal defenders of group rights who
maintain that special protections may be necessary for cultural
minorities. She claims that when a culture “endorses and facilitates
the control of men over women in various ways,” to accord group
rights to such a culture is “antifeminist,” because such rights
“substantially limit the capacities of women and girls of that culture to

90. Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture 86-100 (2002).
91. See Sunder, supra note 8; Louise Halper, Negotiations of Law and Gender:
Living Shari’a in Iran (Oct. 2003) (Working Paper No. 03-18), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=453523.
92. Benhabib, supra note 90, at 83-84 (drawing on the list of cultural practices that
most often lead to “clashes of intercultural evaluation” found in Bikhu Parekh,
Rethinking Multiculturalism 264-65 (2000)).
93. Id. at 100-01; Okin, supra note 7.
94. Okin, supra note 7, at 11.
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live with human dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to live as
freely chosen lives as they can.”95
Okin is particularly critical of the role of religious and cultural
traditions in bringing women’s sexuality and reproductive capabilities
under men’s control and in rendering women “servile to men’s desires
and interests.”96 According to Okin, some cultures, namely, Western
liberal cultures, have moved further from their patriarchal pasts than
others. Thus, although “[m]ost cultures are patriarchal, . . . many
(though not all) of the cultural minorities that claim group rights are
more patriarchal than the surrounding cultures.”97
To liberals who stress the need for protecting cultures so that
members within them have a “rich and secure cultural structure”98
within which to develop self-respect and the capacity to make choices
about how to live their lives, Okin responds that pervasive cultural
practices discriminating against and controlling women threaten the
capacity of women to question the social roles that a particular culture
instills and enforces upon them. In other words, the force of gender
socialization and discrimination renders impossible, or very difficult,
the liberal goal of revisability—that is, questioning one’s inherited
social roles and exiting oppressive associations. Instead, putting the
point bluntly, Okin contends:
In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a
less patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the
basis of self-respect or freedom that the female members of the
[former] culture have a clear interest in its preservation. Indeed,
they might be much better off if the culture into which they were
born were either to become extinct (so that its members would
become integrated into the less sexist surrounding culture) or,
preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the
equality of women—at least to the degree to which this is upheld in
the majority culture.99

Okin’s essay invites attention to the place of individuals within
associations and on tensions between personal self-government and
associational self-government. Her critique has garnered considerable
criticism, even among feminist scholars, for its stark framing of the
issue as “feminism versus multiculturalism” and for its allegedly
monolithic and static conceptions of religion and culture.100 Some
feminist scholars view her work as emblematic of a strand of Western
feminist argument that interprets the condition of immigrant or Third
95. Id. at 12.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 17.
98. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 22-23.
100. Several of the other essays in the book based on Okin’s essay raise these sorts
of criticisms.
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World women as a form of “death by culture,” while failing to
recognize serious forms of sex inequality closer to home.101 Moreover,
feminist legal scholar Leti Volpp argues that this “excessive focus” by
Okin and other Western liberal and liberal feminist scholars upon
“minority and Third World sex-subordinating cultural practices” has
other detrimental effects, such as positioning “other” women as
“perennial victims,” thus denying “their potential to be understood as
emancipatory subjects,” and diverting attention away from structural
forces that shape cultural practices.102
In this Article, I am not attempting to delve fully into all of the
controversy over Okin’s essay, and I will not take up in detail the
specific responses Okin has offered to her critics.103 Rather, I would
like to focus on what this disagreement among feminists may
illuminate about how to view the place of associations in securing or
hindering equal citizenship. I also consider how some of the basic
features of political liberalism, as discussed above, might usefully
contribute to thinking about this issue.
It would be unfortunate if Okin’s blunt statement of the issues
diverted attention from what I believe is an important underlying
point: Religious and cultural traditions often serve as justifications for
restricting women’s self-determination and for various forms of
gender-based inequality.104 Moreover, forms of sex discrimination
rooted in social attitudes and religious and cultural understandings
can persist notwithstanding formal legal guarantees of rights to liberty
and equality.105 (As a helpful example of why Western feminists
should be alert not just to forms of sex inequality abroad but also to
those at home, the New York Times recently featured a story about
the persistence of sex-selection abortion in India because of a
preference for sons over daughters and another story about the
persistence in the United States over the last sixty years of higher
divorce rates among couples with only girl children than couples with
101. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1181,
1185-95 (2001). For an elaboration of how the idea of “death by culture” underlies
some Western feminist analysis of problems experienced by non-Western women, see
Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures 84-88 (1997) (discussing the role of “culture” in
purporting to explain dowry murders in India).
102. Volpp, supra note 101, at 1204-05 (also identifying directing attention away
“from issues affecting women that are separate from what are considered sexist
cultural practices”). For a helpful, earlier discussion of feminist debate over
universalist versus cultural relativist approaches to human rights, see Tracy E.
Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 Harv. Women’s L.J. 89
(1996).
103. See Susan Moller Okin, Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Questions,
No Simple Answers (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
104. See also Benhabib, supra note 90, at 100 (criticizing Okin’s essay in certain
respects but observing that “[c]ertainly Okin was right in raising these issues”).
105. See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals
Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 Colum.
J. Gender & L. 154 (2003).
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only boy children.106) My co-panelist Tracy Higgins’s report on her
human rights mission to Ghana found that despite the enactment of
laws affirming formal equality for men and women in the areas of
property and inheritance laws, social resistance to such equality and
traditional attitudes about the sexes hinders the enforcement of such
laws.107 The transition in Afghanistan from a condition of extreme
repression of women (justified by an appeal to religion) to a new
constitutional order with formal guarantees of equality may afford
another example. How will the constitution’s guarantees of freedom
from discrimination and of equal rights and duties before the law
reconcile with the provision that “no law can be contrary to the sacred
religion of Islam” and that laws protecting the family (especially the
child and mother) shall not be contrary to “the sacred religion of
Islam”?108
Recognizing that some cultural and religious practices and
teachings appear to justify sex inequality, and thus may hinder rather
than foster women’s personal self-government, is an important
component of a feminist analysis of the place of associations. As
discussed above, whether the appropriate distinction is between
reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, or a different
limiting principle, affirming the freedom and equality of women as a
political value justifies certain protections of women even when they
are members of associations (for example, the important liberal right
to exit oppressive communities). A further useful step, however, is
one being urged by a variety of feminist scholars seeking to move
away from a “rights versus culture” framework to one of “rights
within culture,” or rights within religious and cultural communities.
For example, Uma Narayan acknowledges the use of “culture” to
justify various forms of gender inequality, but goes on to argue that
there is often considerable internal contestation of the meaning of
“culture,” including readings more supportive of women’s equality
and liberty.109 Thus, some feminist scholars argue for a right to remain
within a cultural or religious community and to affirm sex equality and
autonomy.
The model these feminist scholars advance recognizes a positive
value to being within a community and the constitutive role of
membership in shaping the self, even as it insists on bringing into that
sphere limiting principles of equality and freedom. This feminist work
106. Compare David Rhode, India Steps Up Effort to Halt Abortions of Female
Fetuses, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003, § 1, at 3 with David Leonhardt, It’s a Girl! (Will the
Economy Suffer?): Couples With Boys Are Divorcing Less, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003,
§ 3, at 1.
107. Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture, and
Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 Fordham Int’l L.J. 259, 295-311 (2001).
108. See Afg. Const. art. 2, 22, 54 (2003 Draft), available at http://www.constitutionafg.com/draft_const.htm.
109. Narayan, supra note 101, at 3-39.
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focuses on the place of individuals within civil associations by insisting
on their rights to be represented when courts or legislatures must
consider what conception of a particular cultural or religious tradition
should guide a law or a judicial opinion.110 Such feminists contend
that, too often, when courts and legislatures confront claims based on
religion, they view religion as static and unchanging and “defer[] to
fundamentalist claims to discriminate in the name of religion or
culture, thwarting the claims of dissenting women and other advocates
of change.”111 For example, Madhavi Sunder offers examples of such
political actors interpreting and upholding “personal laws” and
“customary laws” without listening to the voices of those within
communities that seek to make such laws more just.112 Similarly, Gila
Stopler, focusing on Israel, which has personal religious laws, and the
United States, which is constitutionally committed to the separation of
church and state and to gender neutrality in its laws, contends:
In all these cases state power is used in the service of community
leaders and the patriarchal and hierarchical norms these leaders
seek to impose for their benefit, at the expense of the basic right to
equality of the community’s weaker members as well as at the
expense of their right to participate in the shaping of the community
in which they live.113

Sunder argues that current human rights discourse offers women
and other dissenters too stark a choice: rights or culture. Instead,
women should have the right not just to exit religious communities,
but also to participate in shaping those communities and to have their
voices heard in defining those communities’ norms and values. She
critiques current legal treatment of religion:
Premised upon an outmoded conception of religion as homogeneous
and static, law presumes religious communities have a uniform view
and refuses to confront actual plurality and contestation within a
religious community. But . . . [a]ll over the world, women are
contesting traditional customary and religious laws and demanding a
right to participate in the process of making religious or cultural
meanings. Seen in this light, current law is procedurally faulty
because law does not recognize everyone equally within the
community as having a say in these processes. . . . Women’s activism
around the globe also challenges the normative premise of current
law, which accepts (and expects) imposed identity and despotism
within religion, so long as one has freedom in the public sphere.
Departing from this traditional view, women are today making
normative demands for a right to freedom and equality within
110. See Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development
Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41
Harv. Int’l L.J. 381 (2000).
111. Sunder, supra note 8, at 1425.
112. Id. at 1425-33.
113. Stopler, supra note 8, at 35.
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religion, as well as in the public sphere. But current law ignores
these claims.114

Sunder offers as case studies of this “dialogical model,” which
enables women to claim both rights and religion, the efforts of the
group Women Living Under Muslim Laws (“WLUML”) and the
human rights manual, Claiming Our Rights: A Manual for Women’s
Human Rights Education in Muslim Societies.115 These groups find
support for sex equality from a critical engagement with the internal
norms of such religious and cultural traditions, and not solely from
public values and norms from “outside” such traditions. For example,
although she does not call herself a feminist, the recent Nobel Prize
winner, Iranian human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi, characterizes her
mission as pressing the case that Islam is compatible with human
Sunder
rights, including treating women equally with men.116
highlights that WLUML stresses that it is only when women assume
the right to “define for themselves the parameters of their own
identity and stop accepting unconditionally and without question what
is presented to them as the ‘correct’ religion, the ‘correct’ culture, or
the ‘correct’ national identity that they will be able effectively to
challenge the corpus of laws imposed on them.”117
New forms of association play a vital role in this work of fostering
self-definition and the assertion of individual agency. This relates to
the role of associations, discussed in Part I, in fostering self-respect, as
well as alternative conceptions of justice both within associations and
in the polity. For example, WLUML’s creation of a network that
collects and disseminates information about the actual diversity of
laws and customs throughout the Muslim world and its sponsorship of
face-to-face meetings “help to break women’s isolation” and to
“undermine the claims of fundamentalists that there is just one way of
being Muslim.”118 These forms of associational life also serve a critical
educational role in letting women know about other possible ways of
being and doing. As one official within WLUML put it, “[we are]
giving women the tool to be able to say that women’s rights are part of
your own culture.”119
It may be apt to think of groups like WLUML as creating
“counterpublics” or “deliberative enclaves of resistance,” in which
members of the association are able to work out a sense of identity
114. Sunder, supra note 8, at 1432-33.
115. Id. at 1433-51 (citation omitted).
116. Elaine Sciolino, A Prize, Laureate Says, ‘Good for Democracy,’ N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 2003, at A6.
117. Sunder, supra note 8, at 1439-40 (quoting Farida Shaheed, Controlled or
Autonomous: Identity and the Experience of the Network, Women Living Under
Muslim Laws, 19 Signs 997, 1008 (1994)).
118. Id. at 1437.
119. Id. at 1438 (quoting Cassandra Balchin, assistant director of WLUML’s
international coordination office in London).
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and of rights that is not reflected in the dominant view of law and
culture, but that may eventually lead to changes in that view.120 As
such, they play a facilitative role in fostering women’s personal and
democratic self-government. Similarly, Nussbaum contends that, in
India, conventional families may do less well than women’s collectives
in fostering women’s capabilities.121 Narayan’s recounting of Third
World feminism also highlights the critical role of association. She
argues that although the experience of daughters of seeing gender
dynamics of injustice and oppression within their own family and their
parents’ marriage was a source of a critical awareness, “it takes
political connections to other women and their experiences” along
with political analysis and attempts to construct solutions to “make
women into feminists in any full-blooded sense.”122
There are analogies to the role played by associations and social
movements in the United States.
For example, feminist
consciousness-raising groups served both to facilitate women’s
capacity to fashion a sense of identity different from the one prevalent
in the dominant culture and to prefigure forms of association
premised on greater equality.123 Social movements may succeed in
placing forms of inequality previously regarded as private on the
agenda as matters of social and political justice.124
As noted in Part I, civil society, or what Rawls calls “the
background culture” of civil society, may generate new
understandings of the requirements of justice, and these may bear
both on norms governing associational life (as when a dissident group
within a religion argues for a new interpretation), as well as on those
governing the polity. Notably, both Rawls and Benhabib refer to the
realm of civil society as a place of “moral learning.” This entails not
only learning such civic virtues as tolerance, but also, for Benhabib,
the learning that takes place through cultural and political conflict in a
“civic public space of multicultural understanding and
confrontation.”125
What sort of model of associational life and of affirmative
individual rights and governmental responsibilities would this
emerging feminist model of rights within cultural and religious
120. See McClain & Fleming, supra note 25, at 318.
121. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 277.
122. Narayan, supra note 101, at 11.
123. I am grateful to Amy Baehr for this suggestion.
124. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking
(2000) (relating the history, struggles, and successes of the battered women’s
movement); Phoebe Hoban, Masks Still in Place, but Firmly in the Mainstream, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 2004, § 2, at 34 (describing how the Guerrilla Girls—who call
themselves “the conscience of the art world” and who accused the art world of sexism
and racism and challenged the exclusion of women artists from museums—have
“gone almost mainstream”).
125. Benhabib, supra note 90, at 130-31.
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communities entail? Would adopting a model of individual rights
within culture and within community threaten the solidarity and
strength of community life? Would it constitute the sort of direct
application of principles of justice to the “internal life” of associations
that political liberalism rejects? Could elements of political liberalism
support this model? For example, if members of associations are
engaged in a struggle to determine the appropriate conception of
justice and set of principles and values that should apply to their
associational life, may the state properly play a role to facilitate this
process?126 How might such a model, for example, shape laws and
policies pertaining to regulating religious associations and other
associations in the United States?127 What would it imply about
efforts to promote sex equality across borders, for example, in the
same countries in the Middle East, in which interpretations of Islam
are asserted—and contested—as a basis for restrictions on women’s
liberty and equality?
Answering this difficult set of questions is beyond the scope of this
Article. My hypothesis, however, is that a fruitful place to begin is
with the place of individuals within civil society, and, in particular,
with problems of how associational life may be a place in which
individuals negotiate equal citizenship, a place that may foster as well
as resist such citizenship. For example, Nussbaum argues that
government has a responsibility to foster the capabilities and liberties
of each person. She makes the intriguing comment that the human
capabilities approach “does not assume that any one affiliative
grouping is prior or central in promoting those capabilities.”128 Thus,
when she discusses the extent of governmental protection of freedom
of religion, she stresses that the “protection of the central capabilities
of citizens should always be understood to ground a compelling state
interest,” which would justify limits to such freedom.129 It would be
fruitful to pursue further Nussbaum’s suggestion that, in determining
governmental regulation of and protection of associations, we should

126. For example, Ayelet Shachar proposes a model of “transformative
accommodation,” or joint governance by the state and by religious and cultural
minority communities, designed to empower vulnerable members of such
communities, such as women, by putting internal pressures on those communities to
address entrenched inequalities. Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions (2001).
127. It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer an argument about the issues of
Free Exercise raised by this question. But for one argument critical of current
constitutional law, see Stopler, supra note 8 (contending that current constitutional
jurisprudence affords religions the “free exercise of discrimination” on the basis of
sex, and that the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the Boy Scouts’ right to exclude
homosexuals from membership, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000), portends that this freedom to discriminate will extend more broadly to all
associations).
128. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 276.
129. Id. at 202.
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focus on the person within the group and on how different groupings
of persons do in protecting and promoting capabilities.
For example, I agree with Nussbaum that such an approach could
endorse governmental support of associations dedicated to advancing
women’s educational attainments, economic self-sufficiency, and
political efficacy. However, I disagree with her that Rawls’s political
liberalism might not support such associations because, if participation
in them gives women a sense of empowerment that transforms their
role within family life, government might be endorsing one form of
family governance over the other.130
I believe that a better
interpretation of political liberalism is that, through such support,
government permissibly seeks to remedy the effects of the “gender
system” (discussed in Part I) and advances the political value of the
freedom and equality of women. Similarly, in contrast to Nussbaum, I
believe that these commitments within political liberalism—along with
its commitment to reducing the involuntary gendered division of labor
in society—would justify public education of children aimed at
encouraging “the public perception that women are suited for many
different roles in life, and are active members of the political and
economic communities.”131
Representation, as well as freedom to dissent, appear to be critical
factors in the new model urged by Sunder and other feminists. But
both of these factors are consistent not only with political liberalism
but also with Okin’s liberal feminist proposals. In her essay, Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Okin urges that “policies designed
to respond to the needs and claims of cultural minority groups must
take seriously the urgency of adequately representing less powerful
members of such groups.”132 She continues: “Unless women—and,
more specifically, young women (since older women often are coopted into reinforcing gender inequality)—are fully represented in
negotiations about group rights, their interests may be harmed rather
than promoted by the granting of such rights.”133 In her more recent
revisiting of the question, she reiterates the importance of
representation. She further recognizes the difficult tension between
democracy and liberal rights: What happens if women, “when
consulted in truly non-intimidating settings, . . . produce good reasons
for preferring to continue aspects of their traditional subordinate
status over moving to a status of immediate equality within their
group?”134
130. Id. at 280-81 (discussing the example of women’s collectives in India).
131. Id. at 282 (arguing that her capabilities approach would support such
education, but Rawls would likely see it as “too much promotion of a definite
conception of the good”).
132. Okin, supra note 7, at 23.
133. Id. at 24.
134. Okin, supra note 103, at 29. Okin also argues that more democratic solutions,
which might allow women, fully involved in the process, to affirm practices of
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In The Law of Peoples, Rawls also stresses the importance of
representation and the right of dissent. He posits that there could be
decent nonliberal peoples, and one example he explores is a society
that has a “decent consultation hierarchy.”135 He stresses both the
need for a right to dissent and the place that the representation of
women should play in such a hierarchy in order for it to be “decent.”
He also insists that such a society may not violate human rights. On
the first matter, Rawls argues:
In political decisions a decent consultation hierarchy allows an
opportunity for different voices to be heard—not, to be sure, in a
way allowed by democratic institutions, but appropriately in view of
the religious and philosophical values of the society as expressed in
its idea of the common good. Persons as members of associations,
corporations, and estates have the right at some point in the
procedure of consultation (often at the stage of selecting a group’s
representative) to express political dissent, and the government has
an obligation to take a group’s dissent seriously and to give a
conscientious reply. It is necessary and important that different
voices be heard, because judges’ and other officials’ sincere belief in
the justice of the legal system must include respect for the possibility
of dissent.136

Moreover, “should the judges and other officials listen, the
dissenters are not required to accept the answer given to them.”137 As
Rawls elaborates, “they may renew their protest, provided they
explain why they are still dissatisfied, and their explanation in turn
ought to receive a further and fuller reply.”138
Rawls also gives special attention to the “representation in a
consultation hierarchy of members of society, such as women, who
may have long been subjected to oppression and abuse, amounting to
the violation of their human rights.”139 He proposes:
One step to ensure that their claims are appropriately taken into
account may be to arrange that a majority of the members of the
bodies representing the (previously) oppressed be chosen from
among those whose rights have been violated. . . . [O]ne condition
of a decent hierarchical society is that its legal system and social
order do not violate human rights. The procedure of consultation
must be arranged to stop all such violations.140

inequality, might be appropriate in the case of patriarchal cultures or religions with a
claim of recent oppression, but that a more liberal solution—insisting upon basic
rights that may not be negotiated away—would be appropriate for patriarchal
religions with no such claims. Id. at 28.
135. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 10, at 72.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 75.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
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Finally, Rawls posits that the impact of allowing representatives to
dissent may lead to change favorable to greater equality for women.
Using the fictional example of “Kazanistan,” an idealized Islamic
people with a system of law that does not institute the separation of
church and state, he asserts:
I further imagine, as an example of how dissent, when allowed and
listened to, can instigate change, that in Kazanistan dissent has led
to important reforms in the rights and role of women, with the
judiciary agreeing that existing norms could not be squared with
society’s common good idea of justice.141

In this example, Rawls appears to reject the idea that religious or
cultural comprehensive doctrines are univocal or static and
unchanging. An important point in this passage is that allowing
women to express their own views of justice may lead to a revision of
a society’s “common good idea of justice.”
Of course, one might argue that it is wrong to leave the rights and
role of women up for negotiation, rather than to entrench rights and
liberties either as a matter of human rights or in a constitutional
scheme.142 But this passage in Rawls must be read in light of his
insistence (discussed above) both that a decent nonliberal people does
recognize basic human rights and that religions may not justify the
subjection of women necessary for such religion’s survival. Thus, the
passage may mean that, over time, evolution toward greater sex
equality occurs because of the active role of dissent, or of what the
feminists discussed above might call the efforts to secure rights within
religion and community. Moreover, a “decent nonliberal society,” by
recognizing basic human rights and rights to representation and to
dissent, provides conditions under which members of society may
make such efforts at transformation without fear of punishment or
rights violations by the legal system or the “social order.”143
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have approached the question of the import of
Rawls’s political liberalism for the topic of equal citizenship and
gender by examining political liberalism’s account of the place of
associations in underwriting a stable political order and fostering
democratic and personal self-government. I have focused upon a set
of feminist criticisms arising from political liberalism’s distinction
between the political and the nonpolitical domains and its provision
that the principles of justice should not apply directly to the internal
life of associations. In evaluating this criticism, I have stressed the
141. Id. at 78.
142. This seems to be a concern expressed in Drucilla Cornell, At the Heart of
Freedom 153-54 (1998).
143. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 10, at 75.
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way in which political liberalism views these domains as reciprocally
constituting and mutually supporting. This feature of political
liberalism leads to certain tensions, but it also rules out a sort of
simplistic distinction between public and private life that would regard
the realm of associational life as beyond the scope of the principles of
justice. To the contrary, I have argued that certain commitments
already manifest in political liberalism may be drawn upon—and built
upon—to develop an account of the place of associations in the
political order that recognizes both the ways in which associational life
may foster as well as hinder free and equal citizenship. This
recognition of the possible tension between associational and personal
self-government, and the difficult questions about how government
might address such tensions, is a fruitful avenue for further
engagement between feminism and political liberalism. Moreover, I
have suggested that this same tension is a significant focus in
important feminist work on the place of women within cultural and
religious communities that resists dichotomies between rights and
religion or rights and community.
In sum, I believe that two forms of constructive engagement would
be valuable paths for feminist analysis of the place of associations in
securing and hindering the freedom and equality of women: first,
continued constructive engagement by feminists with Rawls’s work;
and second, constructive engagement by liberal feminists, such as
myself, with these promising forms of feminist argument that seek to
negotiate rights within religion and culture. These two projects are
vital ones both with respect to the issue of gender and citizenship in
the United States and in the global context.

